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The underlying tension between states has a significant impact on international relations,
but how can we capture and quantify interstate tension? Taking advantage of the market
volatility induced by leaders’ threats, I use investors’ fear and financial maneuvering to
quantify interstate tension. In this thesis, I disentangle interstate conflict from interstate
tension and propose a general formula for interstate tension derived from the equation for
longitudinal strain in continuum mechanics. As a test case, I observe the daily price of the
Russian Volatility Index (RVI) from 2013 to 2019, and analyze the impact of threats on stock
market volatility. I find each verbal threat directed at the Russian state increases the RVI price
by 0.96 points. Using the formula for interstate tension developed in this thesis, this
discontinuous increase in market volatility translates to a 3.34% increase in dyadic interstate
tension. This thesis presents a method for calculating interstate tension, extends the
sociophysics literature into international finance and conflict research, and provides an
additional avenue for modeling the interaction between states.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Russia’s seizure of the Crimean Peninsula came as a surprise to the international
community, despite the palpable tension between the two regimes (Treisman 2020). On
Sunday, February 23, 2014, a warrant was issued for the arrest of Ukrainian President Victor
Yanukovich, who fled the country amid protests calling for his execution (Karmanau and
Danilova 2014). On Monday, February 24th, Russian prime minister Medvedev called the
transitioning Ukrainian government “illegitimate”, and protesters called for the division of
Ukraine along ethnic, linguistic, and political lines (Myers 2014). By Wednesday,
pro-Russian and pro-Crimean protesters clashed outside the regional parliament, and Russia
accused the West of supporting “terrorists in Kiev” (Flikke 2015). On Thursday afternoon,
members of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet seized several government buildings in Simferopol and
occupied an international airport in Crimea. By Sunday, President Vladimir Putin claimed
complete operational control over Crimea. The annexation highlighted the speed of
international disputes, but can we catch up?
Future conflicts may escalate as quickly as the Crimean incursion and with potentially
greater consequences. India-Pakistan nuclear tensions, the Iran-Israel proxy wars, and the
Beijing-U.S dispute over the South China Sea can escalate within moments, and we are
analytically blind to the rapidly developing tension between the respective dyads. Although
scholars have developed increasingly sophisticated conflict early warning systems, research
centered on predicting militarized disputes and rare events overlooks the underlying tension
between states. The study of rare events in international relations, such as war, is extremely
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important. But, we could complement this wide body of research by focusing on the
evolution of threats that might make such rare events more likely.
As it stands, many measures of interstate conflict focus on more intense and infrequent
instances of violence. Consequently, in the interim moments between observations, it cannot
sufficiently capture the tension between states. As we consult experts about the potential
conflict, collect data on the previous war’s body count, and observe the annual index of
military capabilities, leaders can signal their intention to take a peninsula before we assess
their increasingly hostile signals (BBC 2015). Fortunately, conflicts do not spontaneously
appear. Before an interstate conflict, leaders often communicate their intentions to escalate a
dispute (Schelling 1980; Sechser 2011; Slantchev 2005). Leader’s hostile signalling increases
the tension between their respective regimes, and citizens react to a potential escalation.
What scholars have regarded as cheap talk may have a significant impact on international
relations, but we have yet to quantify the tension induced by threats with any degree of
granularity. Further, if hostile signalling were linked to a real-time barometer of public fear, it
would allow us to explore two important questions: (1) Do hostile signals (threats) have an
immediate impact on dyadic tension? (2) Can interstate tension be both captured and
quantified by observing the targeted states’ reaction to external threats?
Given that leaders often communicate their intention to engage in interstate conflict, as a
means of deterrence and/or coercion, their hostile signalling increases interstate tension, and
this tension induces fear in the targeted state’s financial market. Investors are attuned to
shifting market conditions and respond to rising interstate tension by purchasing put options1.
1Put options are akin to insurance, where investors can protect themselves from a forthcoming decrease in equity
share prices.
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Volatility indices capture the discontinuous purchasing of put options and effectively
represent the markets’ fear induced by interstate tension. Taking advantage of the relationship
between hostile signalling and the rapid hedging among investors, quantified by volatility
indices, I can assess the underlying tension between states.
In line with Gentner (1983) structure mapping theory, I argue hostile signals feed the
underlying tension between states and interstate tension can be quantified with an analogical
model derived from the formula for longitudinal strain.2
In this thesis, I assess the volatility induced by hostile signals directed at Russia from
2013-2019. I find that hostile signalling has an immediate effect on market volatility, and in
the case of Russia, each external threat increases the RVI by 0.96 points. Using the formula
for interstate tension, proposed in this paper, I find that tension increases by 3.34% with each
hostile signal. By providing a general model for interstate tension based on an indicator
typically associated with international finance, this thesis contributes to both international
political economy, and international conflict research. Further, by drawing the parallel
between interstate tension and material elasticity (longitudinal strain) this thesis furthers the
integration of sociophysics into the field of political science.
In the next section, I introduce the literature on hostile signalling, measures of military
capabilities, and financial volatility. Then, I propose a formula for interstate tension modeled
after the formula for longitudinal strain. Finally, I examine the Russian Volatility Index (RVI),
analyze the impact of hostile signalling on market volatility, and quantify interstate tension.
2In continuum mechanics, the elongation of solid objects produces a strain up to the material’s breaking point.
This strain is similar to the interaction between states, where the tension between regimes increases up to its
breaking point (war) or its amelioration (cessation of hostilities).
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW
Leaders signal their intention to escalate an interstate dispute by issuing threats. But,
leaders have an incentive to feign belligerence and bluff about their willingness to escalate the
conflict (Schelling 1980). Given the costs in preparing for an interstate dispute, the targeted
regime assesses the threat before acting (Igoe Walsh 2007; Yarhi-Milo 2013). Not all threats
are considered equal, the tension induced by hostile signalling is contingent upon the threat’s
credibility and the potential ramifications of an escalated conflict (P. Huth and Russett 1993;
Leng 1993).
Among the myriad of factors that impact the credibility of hostile signalling, one of the
primary factors targeted states consider is the signaler’s audience costs, or the domestic
penalty should the leader fail to follow through with their hostility (M. J. C. Crescenzi 2018;
Jervis 1989). For instance, when the signalling regime is undergoing a financial crisis or has
recently engaged in an interstate dispute, they face higher costs for following through with
their threat. When leaders issue a threat despite higher audience costs, they effectively tie
their hands in the conflict and signal their willingness to bear the cost of war, should the
conflict escalate. Consequently, their hostile signaling despite high audience costs is deemed
more credible (Crisman-Cox and Gibilisco 2018; P. K. Huth 1999; Fearon 2016).
There are several additional factors that impact the credibility of hostile signals, including:
the signalers reputation and influence within their country (Renshon, Dafoe, and P. Huth
2018; Tomz 2007), the stakes at play for the leader’s tenure in office (Croco 2011), the
leaders military experience (Horowitz and Stam 2014), and their fate after leaving office
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(Krcmaric 2018). Further, several country-specific factors impact the credibility of hostile
signalling. The states’ reputation (M. J. Crescenzi, Kathman, and Long 2007), regime type
(Debs and Goemans 2010; Weiss 2013), economic entanglements (Gowa and Mansfield 1993;
T. M. Peterson 2014), and military power (Carroll and Kenkel 2019; Fearon 1994)
significantly alter their threat’s credibility. Given the many factors which conditionally affect
the credibility of threats, and the subsequent dyadic conflict environment, it is exceedingly
difficult to forecast the likelihood of dyadic conflict. Nevertheless, there have been
extraordinary strides in conflict prediction and scholars have used the data at hand to assess
the likelihood of escalation.
One of the primary variables used to predict the likelihood of conflict has been the relative
military power between the belligerent states (Carroll and Kenkel 2019; Keohane 2005).
Specifically, leaders consider both the relative power of their state (compared to their
opposition) and the cost of engaging in a militarized interstate dispute. To capture states’
military strength, scholars have observed their ability to convert their material capability to
military power (Treverton and Jones 2005). These “power in outcomes” serve as a proxy for
their actual military power, and the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC)
index is the most commonly used indicator of military capabilities (Hatipoglu and Palmer
2012). The CINC index is a composite measure of states’ total population, urban population,
iron and steel production, primary energy consumption, military expenditure and military
personnel. These containers of power have been used to assess the balance of power between
adversarial states, but the index has some significant issues including: mis-measuring
transitions of power (Kadera and Sorokin 2004), conflictual findings when GDP is used as an
indicator for military capability (Rauch 2017) and increased error during power transitions
(Debs and Monteiro 2014). As an alternative to the CINC index, scholars have observed the
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discontinuous uptick in GDP, and several instruments of military capabilities to quantify the
power between states (Worley 2012).
Although extraordinarily useful in examining militarized interstate disputes, there are two
significant gaps in the previous research. First, nearly every major dispute dataset misses the
daily low-level tension between states. For instance, the Political Instability Task Force
(PITF), Correlates of War (COW), Quality of Government (QOG), World Values Survey
(WVS), Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) datasets are all either
aggregated up to the year or suffer from a significant time delay. Second, while there have
been hundreds of advancements in the study of interstate conflict there has been comparably
little attention given to the tension between states. “Interstate tension” is frequently used in
conflict research, to my knowledge there has yet to be a definitive definition and
quantification posited in the literature. The infrequency of conflict data coupled with the
often-overlooked interstate tension leaves the rapidly fluctuating relationship between
regimes unexplored.
In light of this gap in conflict research, consider five significant research questions which
would naturally arise at the onset of an interstate dispute, none of which were answerable at
the time of the Crimean Invasion: (1) What is the relative military strength of Ukraine
compared to Russia? Scholars typically extract data regarding relative military strength from
the Correlates of War dataset, but its CINC index aggregates the data up to the year and was
last updated in 2012. Given the inherent time delay in acquiring these data, during the
Crimean invasion scholars would have to rely on an index of military capabilities drawn from
several years in the past. 1 (2) When did the conflict reach its peak? Scholars have used battle
1The Correlates of War project has contributed significantly to the study of international conflict. But, without
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deaths as an indicator of intensity, which could be extracted from the PITF dataset, but the
dataset is updated annually, and suffers from the same time delay as the CINC index. (3) How
did Crimea react to the conflict? A measure of diplomatic relations and dyadic trade between
the regimes could elucidate their increasingly tense interaction, but these data would have to
be extracted from the previous year’s Quality of Government dataset. (4) How did Putin’s
audience react to his use of force? Public opinion data, from which we can gather audience
costs, would become available after wave seven of the World Values Survey. But, the WVS
did not release wave seven until two years after the invasion. (5) Finally, which of the
previous measures can account for the dynamic processes inherent in dyadic conflict before,
during and after the incursion? There have been skirmishes between Russia and Ukraine
since the invasion, but this “tension” would be exceedingly difficult to capture with previous
measures of conflict. Treating warfare as a binary outcome misses the gradation of interstate
disputes.
The paucity of readily available data is particularly problematic as the hostility between
regimes may dissipate before we can analyze the contextual effects surrounding the
interaction between states (Taleb 2010). The focus on black swan events using annual
indicators of conflict has conflated conflict with tension at best, and overlooked interstate
tension at worst. A formal delineation between interstate conflict and interstate tension
combined with a daily indicator of interstate tension would fill this gap in previous research,
and allow researchers to better model the interaction between states. To this end, financial
markets present an ideal platform from which we can observe interstate tension.
more granular data, its utility in modeling the dynamic interaction between states is limited.
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Hostile Signals Send Ripples through Financial Markets
Investors are attuned to the relation between states, as interstate disputes have a significant
effect on market capitalization. Post-conflict reconstruction, financial assistance to war-torn
regions, and the potential long lasting depressive effects on the exchange markets means
interstate conflict has a significant effect on investors’ portfolios (Nordhaus 2002). It can take
15-20 years for the gross national product to recover from an interstate conflict (Organski and
Kugler 1977), and the cost of war is particularly high if fought domestically (Caplan 2002).
Oil prices, exchange rates, equity prices and treasury prices are intertwined and are all
significantly effected by interstate conflict (Rigobon and Sack n.d.). An uptick in oil prices
precedes most recessions and threats have a direct impact on the volatility in global oil
markets (Hamilton 1983; C.-C. Lee, Olasehinde-Williams, and Akadiri 2021). Tourism is a
primary source of revenue for developing states (Balaguer and Cantavella-Jorda 2002; Gee
et al. 1997; Sharpley and Telfer 2002), but civil conflict, militarized interstate disputes, and
politically motivated violence all decrease tourism. And, the tension between states is far
from contained within the dyad, as the domestic conflict environment has spillover effects on
nearby countries (Fleischer and Buccola 2002; Neumayer 2004).
Conflict, Trade and Investor Sentiment
Trade has a positive impact on economic growth, with outward-oriented states benefiting
from increased trade flows (Dollar 1992; Ibrahim 1983; Krueger 1980). But, the threat of
an interstate dispute raises the cost of trade, and the potential for conflict is factored into
firms’ decision to engage in interstate commerce. As investors anticipate a disruption in
operations and firms eschew states with a higher likelihood of interstate conflict, interstate
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tension reduces trade flows.
There is a tenuous agreement between realist and liberal theorists regarding the depressive
effects of interstate conflicts on trade flows, but there is a lack of consensus regarding the
effects of trade on reducing the onset of conflict (Anderton and Carter 2001;
M. J. C. Crescenzi 2005). While often mutually beneficial, dyadic trade risks a
disproportionate distribution of benefits between states. This relative advantage could bolster
the opposing state’s military capabilities, and realists argue that the potential supplementation
of an enemy’s war-fighting capabilities causes states to restrict trade flows at the outset of
interstate conflicts. Similarly, liberal theorists also find that war reduces dyadic trade, but they
differ from realist in their causal explanation (Anderton and Carter 2001). In examining the
impact of trade on conflict, liberal theorists argue that states consider the potential reduction
in trade when estimating the costs of engagement, and given the opportunity cost of reducing
trade, economic interdependence reduces the chances of interstate conflicts. Barbieri and
Levy (1999) provide additional nuance, when investigating the connection between trade
flows and conflict, they found that war often reduces trade flows in the short term but has little
impact on the long-term trade relations.
There is significant disagreement regarding the relationship between interdependence and
conflict. Scholars have found that extensive economic interdependence could make conflict
more likely (Barbieri 1996), but in an iterated game in which expectations for future trade
relations affect states’ inclination toward conflict (Copeland 1996), the states’ exit
opportunities shape their decision to use force (M. J. C. Crescenzi 2003). Similar to
Crescenzi’s findings, Li and Vashchilko (2010) found foreign direct investment’s impact on
the onset of interstate conflict is also context dependent. Specifically, they found alliances
increase bilateral investment if the relationship is between a high-income and low-income
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state, but the dyadic investment between two high-income states is largely unaffected by
either conflict or security alliances.
Investors consider the potential impact of interstate disputes and the underlying tension
between states has a significant impact on their financial maneuvering. Volatility indices
serve as an indicator of investors’ collective trading behavior. Specifically, volatility indices
capture investors’ expectation of forthcoming market volatility, and is colloquially known as
the fear index (Whaley 2009). Stock market indicators present an exceedingly granular
measure of investor sentiment, as investors are in a large-scale competition to react to shifting
market conditions as quickly as possible and trade on breaking news nearly instantaneously.
High frequency trading has increased the speed in which the market reacts to news (Foucault,
Hombert, and Roşu 2016; M. L. Scholtus and D. J. C. van Dijk 2012), and the fastest traders
react to macroeconomic announcements within five milliseconds (M. Scholtus, D. van Dijk,
and Frijns 2014). Further, an increase in reaction time from 10 milliseconds to 1 second leads
to a significant decrease in HFT algorithms’ profitability. After the release of macroeconomic
announcements, most of the adjustments occur within the first minute (Ederington and
J. H. Lee 1993). Scholtus van dijk and Frijns (2014) found “news arrivals are a driving force
behind asset price changes.” And, compared to changes in asset’s fundamentals, markets react
significantly more to salient political events (Klibanoff, Lamont, and Wizman 1998).
In brief, investors’ hastened reaction to shifting market conditions presents a potential
source from which interstate tension can be quantified. While interstate tension cannot be
measured directly, if market volatility were mathematically connected to hostile signalling it
would allow for the quantification of interstate tension. In the next section, I use a
sociophysics approach to quantify interstate tension.
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CHAPTER 3: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Interstate conflict and interstate tension are often used interchangeably, but the terms can
be disentangled. Interstate conflict can be classified along three dimensions—size of the
dispute, the issues at stake, and the behavior before the war (Vasquez and Valeriano 2010).
When states engage in interstate conflicts, the consequences are relatively apparent. For
instance, militarized interstate disputes (MIDs), are often measured by the death count, size
of the conflict zone, people displaced, etc. Conversely, interstate tension is a more ethereal
construct.
Interstate tension is conceptually similar to the broader meaning of tension, defined as the
mental strain, stress or excitement affecting the relationship between entities. Both tension
and interstate tension can occur between groups, e.g. the rivalry between Republican and
Democratic parties in the lead-up to an election, or hostile relations between Alawite and
Sunni Muslims in Syria. They can also occur during a state of heightened uncertainty,
induced by an unexpected shock in the interaction between entities, e.g. the tension induced
by a violent outburst from a stranger, or troops amassing along the border between belligerent
states.
In keeping with the conceptual definition of tension, I define interstate tension as the
imminent potential for hostility between states which creates uncertainty among individuals
witnessing the interaction. The ontological distinction between interstate conflict and
interstate tension is in its chronological proximity to the hostility. Interstate conflict occurs
after the onset of the dispute, whereas interstate tension occurs during its lead-up. States on
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the precipice of a conflict (and for some time after the dispute)1 are in a state of high tension.
Interstate conflicts begin at the onset of the dispute and last until the hostility is resolved.
Interstate tension may develop into a militarized dispute, but it is neither a necessary nor
sufficient cause of interstate conflict. In fact, it is often in the best interest of belligerent states
to minimize the tension between their respective regimes before launching a preemptive
attack (Kam 2013).
Economic coercion, reduction in trade or diplomatic relations, and technological sabotage
are among the many potential sources of tension. Further, a rapid shift in capabilities and/or
a sufficiently credible threat can cause high tension between states. For instance, India and
Pakistan have nuclear weapons, a history of Indo-Pakistani disputes, and a dispute could
rapidly escalate into a full nuclear war. So, if either country increased their capability to
deliver nuclear weapons, or directed a sufficiently credible threat at their opposition, it would
increase the tension between the regimes.
Tension, Interstate Tension and Material Strain
Interstate tension is conceptually related to the broader definition of tension, but it can be
mathematically mapped onto a phenomenon in physics called “material strain.”2 Figure 3.1
elucidates the connection between the three concepts. In regard to tension and interstate
tension, they both involve an anticipatory negative shift in affect given an unexpected change
between entities. While interstate tension is a more specific form of tension, the constructs
1The speed in which countries return to a state of equilibrium after a conflict is akin to elasticity in mechanical
physics. Countries with a more robust economy, stronger national defense etc. are likely to return to a state of
equilibrium more quickly, after the cessation of an interstate conflict.
2Interstate tension could also be mapped onto the formula for elastic tension, or the formula for potential energy,
but the closest mathematical analogy appears to be that of material strain, more precisely longitudinal strain.
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often overlap. For instance, in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11th, both tension
and interstate tension increased between the United States and several countries in the Middle
East. However, the domestic tension between social groups, as Muslims were increasingly
targeted for attack, would fall under the broader definition of tension. Put simply, all
interstate tension is tension, but not all tension is interstate tension.
Figure 3.1: Mathematical Analogy for Interstate Tension
The key similarity between tension and interstate tension and what separates these
constructs from material strain is their observability. Material strain occurs within an object,
while tension and interstate tension occur between entities. For instance, when a metal spring
is stretched to its breaking point the “strain” is contained within the material and can be
measured directly. Interstate tension is not contained within a single entity, rather, the tension
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is between states and can only be measured indirectly. Put another way, interstate tension is a
latent construct which can only be inferred from its effect on observable variables.
Further, unlike the laws of material strain, the effect of interstate tension depends on the
idiosyncratic factors surrounding states’ interactions. When leaders issue threats against an
adversary, the amount of interstate tension it produces is affected by their reputation, military
capabilities, the issues at stake, etc. To illustrate how context impacts the effect of threats on
interstate tension, suppose two students are having an argument in a classroom. The students
are best friends, have a history of disagreement without escalation, and the teacher is standing
between them in case the conflict escalates. The argument would likely produce only a low
level of tension (although not necessarily absent). Contrast that to another set of students
having an argument, but this time at a party with their friends watching and instigating the
conflict. They also have a history of arguing, and once or twice have become angry enough to
throw punches. In this case, the tension would be relatively high.
What this says is that the threats interact with the context of the exchange. That context
can be a history of violence, high-stakes domestic politics, and even power balance. If those
same two people have very different “powers” (one is 6’2” and an MMA fighter and the other
is a 5’4” priest, for example), perhaps the threat level and subsequent tension would be lower.
In the context of international relations, the United States does not react to ongoing nuclear
threats from North Korea with much excitement. But, if China were to claim control of the
South China Sea and threaten the Indo-Pacific Command fleet, it would likely produce a
significant amount of interstate tension.
Returning to the argument between students, as the bellicose students lob threats across
the classroom, their words alone would be an insufficient measure of their underlying tension.
Perhaps the students often engage in idle threats, they may have never escalated to conflict or
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perhaps the cost of fighting would be too high for either student. The contextual factors
governing their interaction would be nearly impossible for the teacher to calculate in
real-time. Instead, the teacher could observe the other students’ reaction to the argument, and
use their apparent fear an indirect measure of their underlying tension. Put another way, the
students’ threats would cause a discontinuous reaction from their peers, and this discontinuity
would serve as an indicator of tension. For instance, if their classmates appear unmoved by
the argument, the teacher could safely assume the level of tension is insignificant. However, if
the argument caused half of the class to immediately run out of the room, the teacher could
assume there is a significant amount of tension between the two students.
Similarly, in regards to interstate tension, hostile signals alone would be an insufficient
measure of the underlying tension within the dyad. The contextual factors governing dyadic
relations are too numerous and the data too slow to model interstate tension in real-time.
But, one could observe the response from an audience attuned to international relations and
use their discontinuous behavior as an approximation of the underlying tension between the
states. If leaders direct a hostile signal at an opposing state, and an audience attuned to the
interaction reacts with a high degree of fear, there is significant tension within the dyad.
But to be clear, the tension captured by observing bystanders is only the observable
manifestation of the underlying tension. The actual tension is between the two entities; the
“tension” occurs between states, but it can be observed by analyzing onlooker’s collective
reaction. In the next section I explain the analogous relationship between interstate tension
and material strain (longitudinal strain) and propose both a general model for interstate
tension and a testable specification using Russia as a test case.
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Longitudinal Strain and Interstate Tension
Interstate tension is an unobservable variable (a latent variable), making it comparably
more difficult to capture than interstate conflict. According to Duncan (1975), “latent
variables [are] quite “real” in terms of our theory but (in the present state of knowledge) not
observable except by way of their consequences.” Succinctly, to capture a latent variable, it
must be linked to an observable variable. I propose market volatility can serve as the
observable variable from which interstate tension can be both captured and quantified.
While interstate tension cannot be measured directly, its penumbras can be observed in
the financial market. The global financial system has become increasingly connected and the
signalling game between leaders sends ripples through the financial network. Once a hostile
signal is issued, investors in the targeted state assess the contextual factors surrounding the
threat and immediately react to the interstate tension. Volatility indices quantify investor’s
collective reaction and provide a highly responsive metric from which I can observe the
reverberations of interstate tension.
Known colloquially as the fear gauge, the VIX (in the case of the S&P) and the Russian
Volatility Index (RVI, in the case of the Russian stock market) reveal the collective fear in
their respective markets (Whaley 2009). The next section contains a more detailed breakdown
on how the Volatility Index is calculated. In brief, investors react to shifting market
conditions by purchasing derivative securities. One of the derivatives, a “put option,” serves
as a form of insurance in case prices fall in the forthcoming months. Interstate disputes would
have a significant impact on financial markets, so investors in the targeted state immediately
react to hostile signals by hedging their financial position with the purchase of put options.
Volatility indices calculate the discontinuous purchase of put options and serve as a barometer
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for investor sentiment. Put simply, threats increase interstate tension, investors react by
purchasing more put options, and the volatility index reflects their collective fear. Given the
market’s rapid reaction to shifting market conditions, this connection between threats, tension
and market volatility allows for the observation and quantification of interstate tension on a
granular level.
While interstate tension is conceptually related to the broader definition of “tension”, the
actual properties governing interstate tension are more mathematically akin to “longitudinal
strain” in continuum mechanics. The formula for longitudinal strain can be analogically
applied to the relationship between threats, interstate tension, and market volatility. The
formula for longitudinal strain and its visual representation is as follows:
Figure 3.2: Strain Induced by Force Placed upon an Elastic Object
Where ε—Strain, the longitudinal stress endured by a solid object as it undergoes a
deformation, ∆x—change in length of the material after being stretched, and x0—the length
of the unstretched material.3 The “strain” (ε) is equivalent to the construct in international
3Hooke’s De Potentia Restitutiva (1678) laid the foundation for elasticity, and the formula for normal strain
was derived from Hooke’s law, F = kx. Where F—force exerted on the agent doing the stretching, k—is a
constant (force constant of the spring), and ∆x is the change in the position of x after being stretched. A spring
suspended from a wall has a rigidity before force is applied (k). As a deforming force (F) is applied to the
spring and away from the wall, the spring stretches. The difference between the spring’s initial length and its
outstretched position is ∆x.
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relations referred to as interstate tension. Just as the stretching of an elastic material produces
tension, when the dyadic relations between states becomes more hostile and uncertain, it
creates a tension between the respective states.
The General Model for Interstate Tension, T = ∆V |Pd
V0
The first column of figure 3.3 illustrates the mechanics of a force acting upon an elastic
material, creating a quantifiable “strain”. In line with Hooke’s Law of elasticity, these
representations of longitudinal strain show a spring suspended from a wall has a resting
length (x0) before force is applied. As a longitudinal force4 pulls the string from the wall, the
spring increases in length. The material’s elasticity works against the longitudinal force, and
competing forces create a “strain” within the material. This strain (ε) is equal to the spring’s
change in length (∆x) divided by its original length (x0).
Figure 3.3: Mathematical Analogy for Interstate Tension
4a force applied orthogonally to the spring’s vertical plane
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The second column in figure 3.3 provides a general formula for interstate tension using
market volatility as the elastic material. The general formula for interstate tension captures
the dyadic tension between states (T ) using observable indicators. Where T—interstate
tension, ∆V |Pd—the change in market volatility induced by a potential interstate dispute, and
V0—volatility before the market observes the precursor to conflict.
Baseline market volatility V0 fluctuates according to the financial conditions within the
domestic market. Volatility indices have this resting state V0 built into their formula, as it
controls for the previous 30 days of volatility. Potential interstate disputes Pd cause a
discontinuous uptick in volatility, as investors assess the shifting conflict environment. This
uptick in volatility induced by a potential dispute ∆V |Pd is equivalent to the change in the
length of an elastic spring in the formula for longitudinal strain ∆x. Taken together, the
general formula for interstate tension is T = ∆V |Pd
V0
.
The third column in figure 3.3 provides a testable specification of the general formula,
where the Russian Volatility Index is the stand in metric for market volatility, V . When
sufficiently parsed from its serial correlation, the Russian Volatility Index (RVI) running
average price would be RV I0. After a hostile signal is directed at the regime, investors react
to the threat, raising the RVI price. This change in the RVI induced by hostile signalling
∆RV I|Threat is an instrumentation of the general formula’s ∆V |Pd, and an analogous
model for the strain placed upon an elastic object ∆x.
Threats as the Trigger for Interstate Tension
Although latent variables cannot be directly measured, the trigger for its change and an
observable outcome variable allow for an indirect measure of the original construct (Byrne
2013; Duncan 1975). Using the formula T = ∆RV I|Threat
RV I0
, where tension is equal to
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the change in RVI price induced by hostile signalling divided by its baseline RVI price, the
otherwise unobservable interstate tension can be both captured and quantified.
While threats may cause tension, there are abundant contextual factors that make it an
insufficient measure of interstate tension, when observed in a vacuum. Threats during times
of economic instability and domestic turmoil may cause more tension than in times of
prosperity and peace. Threats from economic or military hegemon may induce more tension
than from weaker regimes. The threats timing, intensity, the relative economic and military
power between states involved, and potentially thousands of other contextual variables can
conditionally affect external threats. Consequently, a simple count of the number of threats
would be an insufficient barometer for interstate tension. However, when connected to the
volatility index, it allows for an indirect measure of interstate tension. The contextual factors
surrounding the hostile signal, its timing and the potential ramifications are built into the
collective calculation of the financial market. This “wisdom of the crowd” approach
outsources the task of analyzing the contextual factors surrounding hostile signals to an
audience attuned to the interaction between states. There are other triggers for interstate
tension, including economic sanctions, border disputes, and state sponsored terrorist attacks.
But, these events are both rare and more appropriately categorized as interstate conflict.
Volatility induced by threats is an appropriate trigger in line with the formula for interstate
tension, as it allows for a sufficiently granular measure of interstate hostility short of the
material breaking point (conflict).
The Russian Volatility Index as an Ideal Test Case
The strength in using the Russian Volatility index as the test case for capturing interstate
tension is four-fold. First, the interaction between Russia and Western states has been
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significantly more conflictual over the last 30 years, than the relationship between the western
powers. Russia is one of the largest recipients of verbal threats from western states, and the
RVI presents the ideal environment in which the effects of hostile signalling can be seen in
the financial market. Threats made by a paring of states with more amicable relations would
not elicit the same level of tension. For instance, the United States may direct their hostile
signalling at European states, but a war between democracies would be unprecedented in the
post cold-war era. Further, their economies and military policies are so intertwined threats are
unlikely to signal potential escalation. Conversely, when western states direct verbal threats at
Russia, the effects on their financial markets are likely to be much more profound. Russia and
most of the western states are either strategically dissimilar, or soft economic rivals and
conflict is significantly more likely to escalate.
Second, the RVI is a direct and rapidly iterating measure of investors’ collective fear. The
speed at which the RVI iterates is convenient, as the volatility index captures investors’
anticipation of a dispute immediately after they process the hostile signal. The previous
indicators of conflict, data on interstate conflict, and public opinion surveys cannot fulfill the
requisite processing speed for a real-time measure of interstate tension. Conversely, the
financial markets react instantaneously to shifting market conditions, and the volatility index
is likely the closest we can achieve to a contemporaneous assessment of interstate tension.
Third, the Russian market is inherently more risky than the more robust stock markets
common in western states (Goriaev 2004). Goriaev and Zabotkin (2006) found the Russian
market to be susceptible to macroeconomic risks factors (such as shifts in commodity prices),
and institutional failings in both state and corporate governance. While an interstate dispute
would send ripples through the Russian economy, the western markets are comparably
unaffected. In fact, in a systematic study of interstate conflict and market volatility, Guidolin
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and Ferrara (2010) found the U.S market typically responds positively to interstate disputes.
This is likely due to investors’ collective belief that the United States would win most military
engagements, and interstate conflicts are unlikely to disrupt America’s robust economy.
Russia’s fragile market provides a skittish environment, where tension can induce a greater
degree of market trepidation. In more stable indices, investors have a weaker reaction to
shifting market conditions as their investments are less likely to falter at the outbreak of a
conflict. Compared to the Russian market, financial markets in western states are significantly
less perturbable.
Finally, by analyzing the effect of hostile signals on one index (the RVI), investors’
reaction to interstate tension remain constant. Investors operating in states with a more robust
economy could be less reactive to hostile signals. Keeping with the language of continuum
mechanics, different markets would likely vary in both flexibility and elasticity.5 For instance,
when North Korea threatens the United States with a nuclear strike, it increases the tension
between the two regimes. Markets likely react with a minuscule increase in volatility before
quickly returning to baseline. The United States represents a material with low flexibility
(little tension induced movement in market volatility, given the robustness of its economy),
and high elasticity (a quick recovery in baseline market volatility, given their military
supremacy). However, if the United States were to direct a similar hostile signal against the






, force divided by the area of the solid. The formula describes the elastic property of a solid,
or its ability to return to its original form after a deforming pressure stretches/compresses it in one direction.
In keeping with the analogy between the mechanical properties of solids and international conflict dynamics,
the time it takes for states to return to a more stable interaction can be related to the mechanical formula for
elasticity.
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DPRK,6 their market would have a much larger increase in volatility and last far longer. The
elasticity is kept constant by examining a single index.
In sum, investors assess both the credibility of hostile signals and its potential impact
before taking costly actions to hedge against the risk of escalation. Hostile statements signal a
potential conflict, which can range from increased barriers to trade, to a full trade embargo
with military intervention. As leaders issue hostile signals, their threats create “tension.” This
tension can be seen in financial markets, where volatility indices provide a measurable
indicator of the markets fear regarding an interstate dispute.
Hypothesis1: Threats will cause an increase in the target country’s volatility index. The
effects of threats on RVI price can be extracted from an ARIMA model. Succinctly, I posit
that hostile signals will immediately increase the tension between states, and this “interstate
tension” can be quantified by observing the change in the target country’s volatility index.




Hypothesis2: As threats increase the tension between states, I propose threats, tension and
volatility will mimic the pattern of increasing longitudinal strain. Specifically, longitudinal
strain increases linearly until it asymptotically curves, and the tension increases until it
reaches a breaking point where the stored energy is released. In the case of the April-9
sanctions, I predict two similar processes. First, both the RVI price and threats will increase
leading up to the onset of the economic conflict. This is similar to the linear increase in
longitudinal strain as the elastic material is stretched. Second, immediately after the conflict,
6This is a hypothetical interaction contingent upon North Korea having a stock market, which it does not have,
governed by typical market behaviors.
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threats will subside and the RVI price will undergo a discontinuous increase. This is
comparable to material’s breaking point, where there is a rapid release of stored energy. In the
case of interstate tension, threats increase dyadic tension up to the onset of conflict. After the
breaking point, the tension is released and there will be little need to issue hostile signals.
Conversely, at the onset of the interstate dispute, the fear of an interstate dispute is confirmed
and the market reacts with a sharp uptick in fear.
Threats uttered while the target country experiences protests, riots, and other forms of
civil unrest may induce greater tension than threats issued while the target country is more
stable. Conversely, hostile signals from poor countries, militarily weak regimes, non-trading
partners or from non-credible leaders may induce less tension in the targeted state. To test
the robustness of the formula’s baseline assumptions, where threats increase the tension and
RVI Price, I will conduct a series of robustness checks controlling for potentially confounding
factors.
Hypothesis3,: Threats will induce a comparable change in RVI price as an economic conflict.
When compared to the effects of the intervention on April-9, where economic sanctions were
levied against Russia. I propose the economic sanctions will have an immediate impact on the
RVI price, but the effects of the economic conflict on the RVI price will be comparable to a
moderately high number of threats.
There are several competing explanations. Signalling countries with a more robust
economy, more foreign direct investment, and larger military expenditure could induce more
tension, and cause a larger uptick in market volatility. Conversely, militarily weak regimes
with small economies may not induce a reaction at all. In the next section, I outline the
research design where I propose a test for the three hypotheses and propose a series of tests to
establish the signal-tension-volatility pathway.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN
To examine the impact of hostile signalling on market volatility, I use the historical prices
of the Russian Volatility Index (RVI), and threats published in news reports. The Cline Center
Historical Phoenix Event Data (Althaus et al. 2020) were coded from roughly 21.2 million
articles from the Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB)-LexisNexis, Foreign Broadcast
Information Service (FBIS), New York Times (NYT), and Wall Street Journal (WSJ). From
this dataset I use their coding for source, target, quad class, and event date. The source and
target represent the hostile signaler and their target, respectively. The quad class is a
five-point measure classifying the event type according to its CAMEO root code. Conflicts
with Cameo 138 (threats to use military force) were used to create the primary independent
variable Threats. These data ranged from as early as 1945 to 2019. Each threat directed at
Russia is counted as one threat, and aggregated up to the day, creating a daily measure of
threats.
The daily RVI price is taken from historical stock prices collected from the Moex
historical data repository (Moscow Exchange n.d.). Similar to the Chicago Board Options
Exchange volatility index for the S&P (VIX), Russia’s volatility index is tied to futures and
options prices. In both cases, investors assess the market conditions and the inherent risk to
their financial position. Their purchase of calls and puts represent the market’s expectations
for future stock market volatility. The formula for the Russian volatility index follows a
similar structure as the Standard & Poor Volatility Index (VIX). The formula for the Russian
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Volatility Index is as follows:




∗ |T1 ∗ σ21 ∗
t2 − t30
t2 − t1




Where T30 – 30 days, expressed as a fraction of a year, T365 – 365 days, expressed as a
fraction of a year; T1 –time to expiration of the near-series options, expressed as a fraction of
a calendar year, T2 – time to expiration of the far-series options; σ21 –variance of the
near-series options, and σ22 –variance of the next-series options. The formula is identical to
the S&P VIX calculation; Osterrieder, Vetter, and Roschli (2019) provide a detailed
breakdown on how the Volatility Index is calculated.
In this derivatives market, investors may buy one of two options contracts: the first is a
call option, which gives them the right to buy the stock at a specific price before an allotted
amount of time. For instance, a call option contract would allow an investor to buy a stock
at $100 sometime within the next year. The investor could then hold the option and buy the
stock when its market price increased to $150, at which point the investor would be entitled
to buy shares at $100 (given the options contract) and immediately sell it for $150 (given the
market rate). Their second option is to buy a “put option.” Put options allow them to sell their
shares at an agreed upon price before a specific date. For instance, a put option would allow
an investor to sell their shares at $100 within a year of its purchase. If the market price for
those shares were to plummet to $50 per share, the investor could purchase the stocks at the
reduced market rate and sell them for the agreed upon $100 per share.
When investors are optimistic about future market conditions, they purchase more call
options, which raises the premium for call options contracts. Conversely, higher demand
for put options increases the premium for put options. Given investors’ expectations and a
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baseline level of volatility, the volatility index quantifies the market’s collective level of fear.
While there are slight derivations of the CBOE VIX, most countries follow a similar formula
and there is a significant correlation between indices. When the price of the volatility index
is over 30, the market expects volatility to be significantly higher in the future, signals a high
risk bear market in the upcoming months. Volatility index prices below 20 are considered low
risk and an upcoming bullish market. Succinctly, investors assess hostile signaling and hedge
their bet against their financial position if they believe the conflict will escalate. Investors
react to interstate tension and their financial maneuvering causes an uptick in put options,
which is captured by volatility indices. The signal-tension-volatility relationship presents an
environment from which the latent construct “interstate tension” can be quantified.
Figure 4.1, demonstrates the potential relationship between conflict and market fear, as
expressed by discontinuous increases in market volatility. Figure 4.1 shows how three of
Figure 4.1: Interstate Conflict and Market Volatility
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the largest upticks in RVI history were caused by interstate conflict. The first of the three
significant upticks in the RVI came with the annexation of Crimea. On February 28th, 2014
Russian Black Sea Fleet soldiers occupied an international airport in Crimea. By nightfall,
Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense acknowledged the invasion. Saturday morning, Barack Obama
denounced the Russian invasion and promised retaliation. By Monday morning, the Russia’s
volatility index more than doubled. The second and largest increase in the RVI, occurred
during the Russian Financial Crisis. A combination of sanctions and a dip in oil prices caused
investors to lose confidence in the Ruble. Market volatility increased, capitalization fell, and
Russia slipped into a financial crisis. The third event, labeled April-9 Sanctions in Figure 4.1,
came with the second round of sanctions imposed on April 9, 2018. The U.S and the EU
responded to Russian election interference and the Ukrainian invasion with sanctions that
nearly collapsed the Russian currency.
All three events have an undercurrent of interstate hostility and demonstrate the
connection between conflict and financial markets. Immediately after the annexation, and just
before both financial crises, leaders directed their hostile signals at the Russian regime. The
threat of potential sanctions was credible enough to elicit uncertainty in the market, and the
ethereal “tension” is evident in the discontinuous uptick in the RVI’s price. To examine these
effects more closely, and test the three hypotheses I conduct a sequence of tests.
ARIMA model: An Autoregressive integrated moving-average (ARIMA) model will
account for the seasonal fluctuations, random noise and the RVI’s moving average. The
ARIMA model is a linear model able to deal with stochastic series. The ARIMA model
consists of an autoregressive model AR “p”, number of series difference “d”, and the moving
average “q.” When the model is optimized, it ensures the residuals from each period are
independent and distributed as normal random variables with mean 0, with variance σ2. To
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optimize the ARIMA model, and achieve the highest accuracy, I used the auto.arima function
to generate the optimal p,d,q parameters. The auto.arima function, which tests several
potential p,d,q combinations, returns the model with the lowest AIC and BIC. This will be a
direct test of Hypothesis1, where I propose hostile signals increase the RVI price, the effects
of which can be used to quantify interstate tension. This test will reveal the direct effects of
threats while controlling for the potential seasonality of the RVI. And, the results from this




April 9, 2018 Event Case Study and Technical Analysis: In this event case study I will
examine the effect of interstate tension on RVI price as it reaches a breaking point. To
analyze the buildup and release of tension surrounding the April-9 sanctions, I conduct a
technical analysis of the stock market data in line with previous methods of interpreting stock
trends (Schwager 1995; Pring and Safari 2014). In accordance with hypothesis2 I propose
threats will increase tension up to a proverbial breaking point, the onset of conflict. In the
lead-up to this breaking point, threats will escalate and the RVI price will increase (to a lesser
degree). Then, at the onset of the conflict, the tension will be released causing threats to
immediately subside and the RVI price to rapidly increase.
Causal impact analysis: The causal impact analysis will allow me to disentangle and
compare the effects of interstate conflict and the interstate tension. In this analysis I will
use the projected RVI price given its baseline price and the number of hostile signals as a
counterfactual control. Then I will compare this projection to the actual increase in volatility
induced by the economic conflict on April-9. By comparing the impact of the economic
conflict versus the uptick in the RVI price induced by threats, this analysis will test the effects
of an interstate conflict versus interstate tension. In accordance with hypothesis3, I propose
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both conflict and tension will increase the RVI price. While the economic dispute will cause a
significant uptick in the RVI price, the effects will be similar to days in which there are a high
number of threats directed at the Russian regime.
Robustness checks: Given the contextual factors surrounding the interaction between
Russia and the western states, I will conduct a series of tests to establish the robustness of the
previous findings. A difference in means test allows a broader examination of the RVI price
during times of high interstate tension (days in which the number of threats are in the top
quartile) versus times of low interstate tension (days in which the number of verbal threats are
in the lower quartile). I will then examine the effects of hostile signalling on market volatility
while controlling for several potentially confounding variables.
In the first series of regressions, I will test the effects of threats while controlling for
domestic factors (within Russia) which could cause domestic uncertainty and overwhelm the
effects of hostile signals. And, the second series of regressions will control for economic and
military factors. These data are taken from the Quality of Government dataset (Teorell et al.
2020). Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis.
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Pctl(25) Pctl(75) Max
Threats 830 3.154 3.033 0.000 1.000 4.000 27.000
RVI Price 1,303 30.154 9.786 14.580 23.290 35.675 112.080
Protests 196 1.622 0.758 1.000 1.000 2.000 3.000
Domestic Conflicts 196 3.138 2.404 0.000 1.000 5.000 11.000
Fatalities 196 0.301 0.839 0.000 0.000 0.000 5.000
Distance (km) 688 4.391 2.121 1.000 3.000 7.000 8.000
FDI out 644 5.346 2.882 1.000 3.000 8.000 10.000
GDPPC 650 1.986 0.813 1.000 1.000 3.000 3.000
Mil.Spend 643 8.087 5.609 0.867 4.722 9.166 33.025
Arms Imports 597 5.347 2.824 1.000 3.000 7.000 10.000
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Data regarding oil and natural gas prices are taken from macrotrends.net historical energy
price data (Crude Oil vs Natural Gas - 10 Year Daily Chart n.d.). Macrotrend’s measures the
daily Brent crude oil price, and not the more common West Texas Intermediate (WTI) Crude
Oil. Although Russia sells Urals oil, its price is benchmarked against Brent crude oil. This is
an important distinction as Brent Crude is discounted at a $1-2 from the West Texas
Intermediate (WTI) Crude Oil, which is a significantly lighter American export. Controlling
for both oil and natural gas prices is important as fossil fuels account for roughly 63.2% of
Russian exports, and profit from oil and gas account for 36% of Russia’s federal budget.
While not an exhaustive set of potentially confounding variables, controlling for these factors
provides a high bar for significance in examining the effect of hostile signalling. However,
conclusions drawn from these controls should be drawn with significant caution, as they
suffer from the same lag pointed to in the literature review. For instance, when controlling for
military expenditure, this estimate of military capabilities is drawn from a dataset which
aggregates military expenditure up to the year. Consequently, threats and volatility may
fluctuate together throughout the year while military expenditure remains stationary.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
To examine the effect of threats on Russian market volatility, I conducted an
auto-regressive integrated moving average model (ARIMA). The ARIMA model establishes
both the baseline RVI price, and the change in RVI price as a direct result of threats.
Returning to the formula for interstate tension, T = ∆RV I|Threat
RV I0
, after optimizing the
p,d,q the ARIMA model’s intercept establishes the baseline RVI price RV I0 using the RVI’s
own lags as predictors. This intercept is akin to the resting strain x0 in the formula for
material strain, ε = ∆x
x0
. The change in RVI price induced by threats ∆RV I|Threat is the
Price ∼ Threats. Table 5.1 shows the effect of threats on RVI Price. I find strong support for
Table 5.1: Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average Model Results
Family: gaussian
Formula: Price ∼ Threats
Data: HostileSignals (Number of observations: 747)
Samples: 2 chains, each with iter=2000; warmup=1000;thin=1
total post-warmup samples= 19800
Population-Level Effects:
Estimate Est. Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Eff.Sample Rhat
Intercept 28.78 0.48 27.84 29.73 6572 1
Threats 0.96 0.23 0.51 1.40 8716 1
Family Specific Parameters:
Estimate Est. Error l-95% CI u-95% CI Eff.Sample Rhat
Sigma 10.03 .26 9.54 10.56 21214 1
hypothesis1 where threats increase the RVI price, and the results drawn from this model can
be used in the formula for interstate tension. Using the aforementioned formula,
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T = ∆RV I|Threat
RV I0
, RV I0 is equal to the intercept 28.78, and ∆RV I|Threat is equal to the
models coefficient, 0.96. Taken together, tension increases by roughly 3.34% with each
hostile signal.
Assessing the Breaking Point: April 9th Event Case Study
To test hypothesis2, I examine the events surrounding the second round of sanctions
levied against Russia on April 9, 2018. Tension between Russia and several western states
increased for several weeks leading up to the April-9 economic conflict. At the peak of
international condemnation regarding Russia’s incursion into Crimea and their interference in
the American election, several European states alongside the U.S issued sanctions against
Russia. During a time of high interstate tension, the economic sanctions caused the RVI price
to double. In accordance with hypothesis2, the trading pattern is akin to the breaking point
for elastic materials. Figure 5.1 provides a visualization of these effects, where each dot
represents the daily price of the RVI, and the shaded area represents the point-wise 95%
confidence interval on the fitted values for both the RVI price and the number of threats.
Notice, the RVI price has a slight uptrend, consistent with the previous findings relating
threats to RVI price. Threats had a sharp upward trend in the 40 days leading up to the
economic conflict, then immediately reversed directionality at the release of the interstate
tension (at the onset of the conflict/the breaking point). Consistent with hypothesis2,
sanctions caused a discontinuous increase in the RVI price. After the tension reached a
breaking point, the market’s fears were confirmed with the sanctions on April-9 (day 0). This
pattern is consistent with analogy for longitudinal strain, in which a solid object is stretched
to its breaking point where, after crossing the threshold, it is abruptly released. In this case,
tension increased until it was abruptly released by an economic conflict. Having released the
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Figure 5.1: RVI Price and Threats Before Conflict Breaking Point
tension, threats immediately decreased after the conflict.
The primary limitation in this technical analysis of the volatility and hostile signalling
pattern, is that it provides only weak evidence regarding the causal relationship between
threats and the RVI price. While it lends support for hypothesis2, the discontinuous increase
in price could have been caused by the conflict, the uptick in threats, or several contextual
factors. Further, it does not allow for the quantification of interstate tension in line with the
formula proposed in figure 3.3. To accomplish this, I conducted a causal impact test, which
would allow the direct comparison of interstate tension versus interstate conflict. Then I
examined the signal-tension-volatility pathway while controlling for several contextual
variables.
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Quantifying the Energy Released at the Breaking Point
While figure 5.1 reveals the trading pattern and the increased hostility leading up to the
April-9 conflict, the effects can be parsed with a causal impact analysis. Table 5.2 shows the
results from the causal impact analysis and Figure 5.2 provides a visual representation. The
causal impact analysis controls for the seasonal fluctuation in the RVI price, and presents the
causal impact of the intervention while controlling for the tension induced by threats. Put
another way, the causal impact test controls for the baseline RVI0, and the change in RVI
price induced by threats ∆RV I|Threat. This allows a direct test of the economic conflict,
juxtaposed against the counterfactual prediction ∆RV I|Threat.
Table 5.2: Causal Impact Analysis Results
Average Cumulative
Actual 26 4232
Prediction (s.d.) 21 (0.4) 3508 (66.2)
95% CI [20, 22] [3377, 3638]
Absolute effect (s.d.) 4.4 (0.4) 723.6 (66.2)
95% CI [3.6, 5.2] [593.9, 855.3]
Relative effect (s.d.) 21% (1.9%) 21% (1.9%)
95% CI [17%, 24%] [17%, 24%]
Posterior tail-area probability p: 2e-05
Posterior prob. of a causal effect: 99.998%
The 95% confidence interval of the counterfactual prediction gathered from the number of
threats and the baseline RVI price, is 21 [20,22];(Table 5.2; Fig 5.2). This means in the
absence of the conflict (the breaking point), the RVI would have had an average response of
21 (Table 5.2; Fig 5.2). But, after the breaking point on April-9, the RVI had an average value
of 26. Subtracting the prediction from the observed response gives the causal effect of the
intervention. And, this effect is 4.4 points with a 95% confidence interval of [3.6,
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5.2];(Table 5.2; Fig 5.2). Put another way, the conflict lead to a 4.4 point increase in the RVI
price. Interestingly, taking the results from table 5.4, threats increase the RVI price by .763
points (±0.166). So the economic sanctions on April-9 induced a comparable level of
volatility as 6 (±1.60) hostile signals.1 This lends support for hypothesis3, where both
interstate tension and interstate conflict both increase the RVI price, and tension is just as
impactful as conflict. The intervention’s cumulative effects (gathered by adding the individual
data points during the post-intervention period) was 4232 points over the next 200 days. If the
intervention had not taken place, we would expect the cumulative sum to be 3508 points. The
95% confidence interval for this prediction is [3377, 3638];(Table 5.2; Fig 5.2).
Figure 5.2 shows the causal impact of interstate tension and the breaking point on April
9th, accounting for the original, point-wise prediction and cumulative effects. The blue
shaded area represents the 95% prediction confidence interval. The first panel shows the
actual test values against the forecasted counterfactual prediction during the post-treatment
period. The intervention point is set at the April 9th conflict onset date, and is indicated with
the black dashed line. The second panel shows the difference between the observed and
counterfactual data, or the point-wise causal effect. The third panel adds the point-wise
forecast from the second model, and yields the cumulative effect of the intervention.
In relative terms, the RVI volatility showed an increase of 21%. The 95% confidence
interval is [17,24%], as shown in table 5.2. The probability of obtaining this effect by chance
is p=0.00002 (2e-05). These effects can be considered statistically significant. The interstate
conflict, which reached its apex on April 9th, had a direct effect on the Russian stock market
1More precisely, a 4.4 point increase in RVI would be equivalent to 5.77 ±1.60) threats
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Figure 5.2: Bayesian Time Series Intervention Analysis Plots
volatility, increasing the RVI price by roughly 21% from its expected price given the RVI
autocorrelation and number of threats directed at the regime.
This quantification of interstate tension, and the energy released by the onset of conflict
provides a framework for modeling both interstate tension and interstate conflict. But,
returning to interstate tension, it could benefit from additional tests to further establish it as a
viable barometer. This conceptualization assumes threats increase tension, which then
increases the RVI Price. But, there are numerous factors which could cause an uptick in RVI
price or overwhelm the effects of threats, including: Russia’s domestic instability at the time
of the threat, the economic strength of the signalling state and the signaler’s military strength.
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Robustness Checks: RVI Threats Controlling for Domestic Instability, and Relative
Strength
To further establish the effect of threats on the RVI price I begin with a difference in
means test, followed by a series of OLS regressions. These tests show the compounding
effect of threats and its linear relationship with RVI price. After these tests, I conduct an
additional series of robustness checks, where I control for the domestic conditions in Russia,
and both the economic and military strength of the signalling state.
Following the analyses outlined in the research design, I conducted a difference in means
test to determine whether the RVI price is higher in the moments where Russia receives the
most threats (top quartile) versus days in which it receives the fewest threats (lower quartile).
Table 5.3 shows the results from the Welch two sample t-test. Days in which Russia received
Table 5.3: Welch Two Sample t-test
Mean RVI
Threats (Top Quartile) 33.22436
Threats (Lowest Quartile) 28.24006
Difference in Mean 5.7253 [3.273628 6.694967]
df:472.47 pvalue:1.838e-08
the most threats (top quartile) had an average RVI price 5.73 points higher than on days in
which it received the fewest threats. The 95% confidence interval is [3.27, 6.69], as shown
in table 5.3. The probability of obtaining this effect by chance, the p-value, is less that 0.01
(1.8e-08). These effects can be considered statistically significant. The RVI price was higher
during the days in which Russia received more threats, and the relationship between threats
and market volatility was not a singular occurrence.
Next, I performed an OLS regression to directly test the linear relationship between
threats and the RVI price. Specifically, the RVI daily prices were regressed on external threats
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directed at Russia in a linear model with unadjusted coefficients. Table 5.4 presents the
estimates and standard errors from a naive OLS linear regression and reveals that each
external threat increases the RVI price by .763 points.










Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
These effects were significant, with a p-value< 0.01, and should be considered
statistically significant. Using the formula for interstate tension:
T = ∆RV I|Threat
RV I0
where ∆RV I|Threat— table 5.4’s coefficient for Threat, 0.763. And, RV I0—table 5.4’s
intercept, 28.982. Each threat increases the tension between states by 2.63%. Figure 5.3
elucidates the linear relationship between the two variables. The results show a strong
positive relationship between threats and Russian market volatility. However, the domestic
environment and the volatility in oil prices could also cause higher volatility. In the next
series of tests, I control for potentially confounding variables.
In this next series of regressions (table 5.5), I observed the effect of threats on the RVI
Price, while controlling for domestic conditions in Russia. Specifically, model one controls
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Figure 5.3: Threats Impact on Market volatility (RVI ∼Threats)
for protests, model two controls for all domestic events, and model three controls for the
total fatalities caused by domestic conflict events in Russia. Across all models I control for
daily Oil and Natural Gas Prices. Finally, model four is a composite model controlling for
both domestic conflict events and fatalities. Across all models, threats had a significant and
positive impact on the RVI price.
The results for both dependent and independent variables were scaled to allow cross
comparison between variables. Across all four models, one standard deviation increase in the
number of threats directed at Russia was associated with a 0.058 standard deviation increase
in the RVI price, with a p-value<0.01. None of the domestic instability variables had a
signficant impact on the RVI Price. The results from this analysis lend additional support for
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Table 5.5: Threats and Market Volatility (Controlling for Conflict and Economic Instability)
Dependent variable:
RVI Price
(1) (2) (3) (4)
RVI Pricet−1 0.817∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗ 0.817∗∗∗
(0.032) 0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Threats 0.050∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗







Oil Price 0.032 0.034 0.031 0.030
(0.046) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
Natural Gas Price 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant −0.090∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗ −0.090∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Observations 280 280 280 280
R2 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.720
Adjusted R2 0.715 0.715 0.715 0.714
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
the hypothesis1, that threats increase market volatility.
In the second series of regressions, presented in table 5.6, I analyze the effect of hostile
signals while controlling for the signaler’s economic status and military strength. Model 1
accounts for foreign direct investment outflows from the signalling country, while model 2
controls for the signalling country’s GDP per capita. Model 3 is a composite model for the
economic battery. Model 4 controls for the hostile countries military spending, model 5
controls for their weapons imports. Model 6 is a composite model for the military strength
variables. Model 7 is a composite model combining all controls from both the economic and
military battery of tests. Across all models I controlled for distance between the two
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Table 5.6: Threats Impact Market Volatility (Economic and Military controls)
Dependent variable:
RVI Price
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
RVI Pricet−1 0.967∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.958∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗ 0.959∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Threat 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.030∗∗ 0.030∗∗
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
FDI 0.007 0.008 0.011
(0.012) (0.013) (0.014)
GDPPC 0.001 −0.003 −0.011
(0.017) (0.018) (0.021)
Mil. Spend −0.007 −0.005 −0.003
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Arms Imports −0.008 −0.006 −0.004
(0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
Distance −0.008 −0.008 −0.007 −0.006 −0.008 −0.008 −0.004
(0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.018)
Oil Price −0.006 −0.005 −0.006 −0.008 −0.014 −0.014 −0.013
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Gas Price −0.013 −0.013 −0.013 −0.011 −0.011 −0.011 −0.012
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant −0.005 −0.005 −0.005 −0.006 −0.003 −0.003 −0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Observations 582 587 582 583 539 526 525
R2 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.933 0.930 0.929 0.929
Adjusted R2 0.932 0.933 0.932 0.933 0.929 0.928 0.928
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
countries, as well as the international oil and natural gas prices. Across all models, threats
were positively associated with an increase in RVI price. Specifically, in models one, two,
three, and four one standard deviation increase in the number of threats caused the RVI price
to increase by 0.028 standard deviations (±0.011). In models five, six, and seven, one
standard deviation increase in threats was associated with a 0.030 standard deviation increase
in the RVI price (±0.012).
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
Hostile signalling between leaders increases dyadic tension and sends ripples through
the financial market. In anticipation of shifting market conditions, investors react by hedging
against their financial positions. Their collective assessment is captured by volatility indices,
which track investors’ collective fear in real-time. This rapid reaction to the interplay between
world leaders presents an ideal barometer from which we can quantify interstate tension.
After drawing a distinction between interstate conflict and interstate tension, I propose a
formula for quantifying interstate tension using an analogical model derived from continuum
mechanic’s formula for longitudinal strain. The general formula for interstate tension is as
follows:
T = ∆V |Pd
V0
where T—interstate tension, ∆V |Pd is the change in market volatility induced by a signal
indicating a forthcoming interstate dispute, and V0—the baseline market volatility before
the market observes the precursor to conflict. As a test case for the formula for interstate
tension, I observed the Russian Volatility Index (RVI), and used threats directed at Russia as
the pre-conflict signal. The formula for the Russian case is as follows:
T = ∆RV I|Threat
RV I0
where T—interstate tension, ∆RV I|Threat is the change in the RVI price given a hostile
signal (threat) from outside the regime, and RV I0 is the baseline volatility price leading up to
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the threat.
The results consistently showed threats have a significant impact on market volatility and
this signal-tension-volatility interaction can be used to quantify interstate tension. In future
studies, hostile signals and market volatility can be gathered in real-time and autonomously
analyzed using the formula for interstate tension outlined in this thesis. For instance, GDELT
captures leader’s threats in near real-time and their data could be outfitted with a live stream
of stock market volatility data and built into a series of algorithms to model interstate tension
on a minute-by-minute basis.
This thesis also provides an additional avenue for the application of sociophysics in
international political economics and conflict research. Given the mathematical similarity
between interstate tension and the formula for longitudinal strain, additional laws governing
material elasticity could help elucidate the intricacies of interstate tension. For instance, in
Hookes De Potentia Restitutiva (1678), he outlines the mathematical relationship between
force and the elongation of elastic bodies:
F = −k∆x
Where F—force exerted on the agent, k—constant (force constant of the spring), and ∆x
—the elastic bodies change in the position after deformation. The formula can be applied to
the credibility of hostile signals, as the “Force” of a threat is contingent upon the recipent’s
belief that the signaler will follow through. In regards market volatility, threats issued by
highly credible signalers have more force, and can be calculated using Hooke’s law. For
instance, consider two threats against China, the first from the United States, the second from
Zimbabwe. The threat from the United States would likely elicit a greater reaction than a
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threat from Zimbabwe. Ceteris paribus, the threat from the United States has more “Force”.
Relating this conceptualization back to the formula for interstate tension, if the change in
market volatility were used as the analogue for the elastic body, a threat from the United
States is likely to cause a larger uptick in volatility and the “Force” could be quantified with a
similar framework outlined in this thesis.
By calculating the relative “Force” of hostile signals, the leader’s credibility and the
factors which conditionally impact their credibility can also be examined. This framework
can be used to empirically test several theories in conflict research, and opens the door to
several exceedingly important research questions: how does the leaders’ in-party control of
the legislature, domestic sentiment, and the public inclination to fight condition the effects of
their hostile signalling? Do republican presidents have an advantage in hostile signalling, or
are they perceived as less credible? Perhaps threats from democratic regimes are perceived as
more credible, but only if the leader is of a particular ideological orientation. The leader’s
reputation, the state’s reputation, and the leader’s incongruent signalling given their
constituents actual level of resolve could also cause unanticipated effects. Further, if data
capturing these case-specific factors can be extracted in real-time, they can be analyzed




Inexplicable Signalling Advantage for Democrats?
Scholars have consistently found Republicans have a distinct advantage over Democratic
presidents, as their constituency is comparably more likely to match their leader’s foreign
policy position be it hawkish or inclined toward peace (Adams, Ezrow, and Somer-Topcu
2011; Mattes and Weeks 2019). While I also found confirmatory evidence that leaders’
ideology has a significant effect on the credibility of their hostile signalling, Table 7.1 reveals
a distinct Republican disadvantage in issuing credible threats. Figure 7.1 highlights the
difference in their hostile signalling.
Figure 7.1: Republican Disadvantage in Hostile Signalling
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This finding is in stark contrast with the vast amount of literature on the Republican
signalling advantage. One potential explanation lies in the differing relationship between
leaders and their constituency. Barber and Pope’s (2019) analyzed the ideological preferences
of conservative voters and found that the Republican constituency was more likely to follow
their party leader’s sentiment rather than maintaining their original opinion. Specifically,
Republican voters did not diverge from Trump’s domestic policy stances despite ideologically
incongruent actions. Despite their more conservative policy preferences, when Trump took a





(1) (2) (3) (4)
Threats 0.178∗∗ 0.202∗∗∗ 0.062 −0.074
(0.079) (0.077) (0.092) (0.092)
Left Leaning −0.041 −0.428
(0.376) (0.380)
Right Leaning −0.804∗∗ −0.951∗∗
(0.377) (0.370)
Gov Fractionalization −0.095 0.457∗∗∗
(0.107) (0.094)




Constant 0.609∗ 0.851∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.809∗∗∗
(0.340) (0.337) (0.103) (0.107)
Observations 271 271 115 115
R2 0.383 0.506
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.488
Log Likelihood -424.572 -416.983
Akaike Inf. Crit. 861.144 849.966
Bayesian Inf. Crit. 882.757 878.783
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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liberal stance, they responded with more liberal opinions. This effect is likely to amplify in
the domain of foreign policy, where voters are comparably less interested, and the president
has more discretion (Fleisher and Bond 1988). Fleisher and Bond (1988) found consistent
support for the two presidencies thesis, where presidents have more success in their foreign
policy decisions than in their domestic policy goals, but in line with previous research, the
advantage only applied to Republican presidencies.
Republican presidents in the modern era have taken a consistently hawkish stance in
international affairs (Clarke 1996; Dueck 2010). And, the Republican coalescence around
Republican presidents during times of hostility has been a consistent pattern since the cold
war (Dueck 2010). Even in instances where the party position was previously inclined toward
peaceful resolution, there has been a consistent pattern of immateriality of the wider
Republican position on Republican presidents’ foreign policy maneuvering, which may be
completely out of step with previous policy goals (Busby and Monten 2012). Conversely, the
Democratic party has been stymied by more liberal sentiment and a disloyal party
(P. E. Peterson 1994; Zoellick 2000). Put simply, the audience for Republican presidents are
likely to support the presidents’ decisions and negate any expected audience costs. Without
the requisite audience costs bolstering their credibility, republican threats are deemed less
credible than their democratic counterparts.
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